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Do Crises Tear the Fabric of Oil Trade? 
Robert J. Weiner 
Abstract 
In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, touching off an economic, financial, diplomatic, and military crisis 
associated with a tremendous spike in oil prices and recession in OECD and oil-importing developing 
countries. But was the Gulf Crisis a disruption? Did it affect the fabric of oil trade? 
To examine this question, this paper examines the changing role of international trade 
intermediaries (ITIs, often referred to as “trading companies”) in the oil market. ITIs connect buyers and 
sellers, serving as the glue that holds many commodity markets together. Oil trading companies have 
attracted harsh scrutiny form policymakers as a result of allegations regarding their role in the United 
Nations’ Iraqi Oil-for-Food Program, but minimal scholarly attention. 
The paper takes advantage of a unique microdatabase on the Brent market. Produced in the U.K. 
North Sea, Brent Blend is by far the most widely traded crude oil in the international market. Participants 
in the Brent market are diverse, with the largest traders falling into two categories. The first comprises 
“industrial MNEs”—companies active in the business of producing or refining crude oil. The second 
category comprises financial houses and trading companies. This diversity provides an opportunity to test 
hypotheses regarding behavioral differences across types of companies and geographic origin, before, 
during, and after the crisis. 
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Do Crises Tear the Fabric of Oil Trade? 
Robert J. Weiner∗ 
I. Introduction 
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait and quickly seized control of the 
country. Combined with the ensuing military build-up in the Gulf region and eventual invasion 
of Kuwait and Iraq by Allied forces, the conflict was associated with a tremendous spike in oil 
prices and recession in OECD and oil-importing developing countries. But did it affect the fabric 
of petroleum trade? 
Past literature on oil crises typically focuses on macro effects such as economic growth, 
inflation, and employment, as well as macroeconomic policy responses. In contrast, this paper is 
part of a research stream examining micro aspects of oil crises.1 The paper focuses on trade 
patterns during the Gulf Crisis, especially intermediation and the role of international trade 
intermediaries (ITIs, often referred to as “trading companies”2). Trading companies were the first 
multinational enterprises (Carlos and Nicholas 1988) and remain important in many countries 
and markets—yet they have received limited scholarly attention.  
The paper is organized as follows. The small literature on ITIs is reviewed in Section II. 
Section III provides background on the industry, the market, and the data. Section IV provides a 
brief summary of the Gulf Crisis. Section V presents hypotheses about regarding the role of 
trading companies in the crisis. Statistical tests are presented in Section VI. Section VII 
concludes.  
                                                 
∗ Dr. Robert J. Weiner is Gilbert White Fellow at Resources for the Future and Professor of International Business 
and International Affairs, George Washington University. He is concurrently Membre Associé, GREEN (Groupe de 
Recherche en Économie de l’Énergie et des Ressources Naturelles), Université Laval, Québec. Weiner received his 
Bachelor’s degree in Applied Mathematics and Master’s and Doctoral degrees in Business Economics, all from 
Harvard University. He is grateful to Peng Zhang for research assistance, to Sarah Beam for editorial assistance, and 
to Liesl Riddle, Refik Soyer, and Phil Wirtz for advice regarding methodology. Any errors are his own. 
1 For previous articles in this stream, see Hubbard and Weiner 1983, Weiner 1994, 2005. 
2 Trading companies are known under a variety of names in the literature; this paper follows Perry 1990 in referring 
to them as ITIs. 
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II. Literature Review 
The transactions-costs approach to international-trade institutions views ITIs as a means of 
dealing with impediments to trade related to information and contract performance (Roehl 1983, 
Carlos 1992, Casson 1998, Peng and Ilinitch 1998, Rauch 2001). ITIs’ competitive advantage 
lies in their relational capital – knowing whom to deal with and trust in unfamiliar markets. In 
eras when information was scarce and costly to obtain, and contracts difficult to enforce, ITIs 
arose separately in Europe (e.g., Hudson’s Bay company, and the Dutch and English East India 
companies, which date to the seventeenth century), North America (e.g., Cargill, started in 
1865), and Japan, where the sogo shosha (general trading companies) were created in the 
nineteenth century (Yoshino and Lifson 1986). 
  The literature on ITIs (e.g., Roehl 1983; Chan 1986; Yoshino and Lifson 1986; Carlos 
and Nicholas 1988; Perry 1990; Casson 1998; Peng and Ilinitch 1998; Peng and York 2001; 
Trabold 2002) is limited primarily theoretical or descriptive, and largely ignores relationships 
between the international environment and ITI behavior. Empirical analysis of ITIs is confined to 
a handful of studies (Peng 1998; Peng and York 2001; Trabold 2002). Behind the scarcity of 
empirical work is the fact that ITIs are both diverse and privately held (and thus report little or no 
financial data).3  
Given their diversity, ITIs are difficult to define, and efforts to pin down ITIs are further 
challenged by their tendency to integrate vertically into production or distribution and 
horizontally into shipping, insurance, and trade finance (Casson 1998). General Trading 
companies (GTCs) deal in a broad array of goods and are often associated with Asia, most 
notably the Japanese sogo shosha. European and North American trading companies, in contrast, 
have tended to specialize in a few commodities (Chalmin 1987). For example, the trading 
company Sucden specializes in sugar, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus in grain, Glencore (formerly 
Marc Rich) and Phibro in petroleum and metals, and Lonrho in metals.  
The research strategy employed here is to examine changes in the role of ITIs in a case-
study market. In addition to allowing avoidance of problems of transaction-cost measurement, 
this approach has some important advantages: First, information and contract-enforcement 
problems are likely to be more serious during turbulent periods, when relative prices change 
                                                 
3 For example, Guex 1998: “In the 1990s, only one of the fifteen main trading companies in Switzerland publishes 
any figures at all and these are limited to few indicators such as sales figures.” 
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rapidly and unpredictably, and the fabric of trade is strained by difficulties in assessing 
creditworthiness of contracting counterparties. The financial crises of recent years thus provide a 
possible laboratory for examining relationships between the environment of international 
business and the behavior of ITIs. 
The conduct of ITIs in oil trading has generated intense scrutiny in the aftermath of the 
Gulf Crisis. ITIs handled the bulk of Iraqi oil exports under the United Nations’ Oil-for-Food 
Program, in effect from 1996 to 2003. Allegations of unauthorized payments by oil purchasers to 
the Iraqi government under the Program led to an investigation by an Independent Inquiry 
Committee, which reported illicit behavior by ITIs (Independent Inquiry Committee 2005). 
Moreover, crises are of interest in their own right, as a prominent and dramatic feature of 
the international economic landscape. The literature on crises tends to focus on macroeconomic 
and financial effects. In contrast, microeconomic effects—impacts on companies—have received 
relatively little attention, and the few studies of the impacts of financial shocks on the real side of 
the international economy have focused on corporate governance (Lemon and Lins 2003), 
profitability (Forbes 2002a, 2002b), or direct investment (Froot and Stein 1991; Lamont 1997) 
and have ignored potential effects on patterns of trade. 
Past literature has neglected the temporal dimension of ITIs’ role and behavior of in 
international trade, or discussed it only as an evolutionary process (Kim 1986; Perry 1990) 
(evolutionary approaches are limited by the fact that changes can result from environmental 
factors unrelated to ITIs). In contrast, this paper takes a “clinical case study” approach, 
examining high-frequency data over a short period. The setting is the international crude oil 
market during the Gulf Crisis of 1990–1991, when Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait touched off an 
economic, financial, diplomatic, and military crisis. This paper examines the fabric of trade 
during the crisis, focusing on the role of trading companies. During a period of unprecedented 
volatility, did their role change? If so, did it expand or diminish, and why? 
To address this question, the paper takes advantage of a unique database of individual sales 
transactions, which identifies the buyer and seller of each cargo of crude oil sold in the 
international market. The crisis provides a natural laboratory for assessing two views regarding 
trade intermediaries: The first view stresses the flexibility and information-gathering advantages 
of intermediaries; in a rapidly changing environment, these advantages should increase. The 
second view stresses risk absorption (Roehl 1983, Casson 1998). In the case-study market, 
trading companies take title to the oil they buy and then resell (or sell and then repurchase), 
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taking on the risk of adverse price movements.4 Financial crises, with their associated volatility, 
should lead not only to an increased need for such risk taking, but also a decreased ability on the 
part of trading companies that are lightly capitalized. If the second effect is strong enough, it may 
outweigh the informational advantages of ITIs, and their role in the market will diminish. 
III. Industry Background 
The World Crude-Oil Market 
Crude oil is the largest single component of international commerce (3-digit Standard 
Industrial Trade Classification code), accounting for 6.2 percent of the value of world 
merchandise trade in 2000.5 The commodity is not homogeneous; prices of different crude oils 
vary, with lighter, lower sulfur types commanding a premium.6 Most shipments are made by 
tanker, with pricing primarily free on board (fob) at tanker-loading terminals, either on a spot or 
forward basis (i.e., one cargo at a time, “spot” indicating delivery as soon as possible) or through 
long-term contracts, with prices indexed to spot trade.7 
Oil prices are extremely volatile, far more so than exchange rates, interest rates, and gold 
prices. Forward sales allow market participants to manage market risk, by locking in prices for 
future delivery.8  
This paper examines trading in Brent Blend, a crude oil produced in the U.K. North Sea. 
Brent is by far the most widely traded crude oil in the international market (Horsnell and Mabro 
1993; Verleger 1993; U.S. Senate 2003), despite the fact that Brent has never accounted for more 
than 3 percent of crude oil in international trade.9 Roughly two-thirds of internationally traded 
                                                 
4 In the typology of trading companies in Casson 1998, ITIs in this market are “resellers,” not “brokers.” 
5 The value is sensitive to the level of oil prices. Data are from United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development Handbook of Statistics On-Line, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1890
6 For background information, see Horsnell and Mabro 1993, Verleger 1993. 
7 Prices of different types of crude oil tend to move together, allowing indexation to a few that are widely traded. 
8 There are also extensive derivatives markets for risk management and speculation, which are discussed in detail 
elsewhere; see e.g., Weiner 2002; U.S. Senate 2003. Verleger 1993 compares price volatility across markets. 
9 Roughly 75 percent of Brent production is exported from the United Kingdom, primarily to Canada, the United 
States, Germany, France, and Holland. All Brent sales are denominated in U.S. dollars. 
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crude oil is sold at Brent-related prices, so the market receives a great deal of scrutiny in the 
trade press.10, 11 
Unlike financial markets, portfolio investors (e.g., hedge funds and individuals) cannot 
play; market participants need to possess not only substantial liquid capital (a single tanker cargo 
is worth $5–30 million, depending on oil prices), but also the industry contacts and managerial 
acumen necessary to charter tankers, transfer title to their contents, negotiate port fees, etc.12 
The Brent market comprises two types of transactions. Spot transactions are for cargoes 
scheduled to be loaded at the Sullom Voe terminal on specific dates, referred to in the trade press 
as “dated Brent.” Forward transactions are a form of “paper trading”—contracting for delivery in 
a specified future calendar month—but do not represent a specific physical cargo.13 An important 
feature of Brent forward contracts is the “15-day rule:” sellers must give buyers 15 days notice to 
allow sufficient time for a tanker to be sent to the Sullom Voe terminal.14 Each cargo loaded in a 
given month is assigned a three-day delivery window. Thus, forward contracts for a given month 
can trade up until the fifteenth day before the third-to-last business day of the month. Spot 
contracts can refer to cargoes to be loaded up to 45 days in the future.15 
                                                 
10 See U.S. Senate 2003; Bossley 2003. The largest oil-exporting countries restrict reselling of their crude oil, 
preventing development of spot trade.  
11 Brent Blend contracts are standardized, with all terms except price pre-established. Contract size is 500,000 
barrels, roughly one tanker cargo, with delivery at Sullom Voe, the site of a tanker-loading platform in the Shetland 
Islands, Scotland. Brent prices are quoted fob Sullom Voe, and buyers are responsible for providing tankers to 
transport the crude oil, which is shipped to refineries in Europe and North America. 
12According to Bossley 2002, “Apart from a sales contract, a cargo needs: letters of credit, which must be updated 
with every change in other documents; shipping contracts; date and volume nominations, re-nominations and any 
date changes; volume tolerance options exercise; notices of arrival and readiness to load; independent inspectors 
and/or cargo agent access to loading site; documentation requirements; negotiable title documents (usually BLs 
[bills of lading]); certificates of quality, quantity and origin; terminal timesheets; inspection reports; notices of 
protest; frequently, letters of indemnity, if other documentation is delayed; invoices; and demurrage and other 
claims.”  
13 Spot transactions account for about 20 percent of the transactions in the database utilized in the paper. Of the 
paper contracts, roughly 65 percent are for one-month forward, 30 percent for two-months forward, and 5 percent, 
three or more months forward. 
14 The rule was changed slightly in mid-2002, to provide 20 days notice and allow sellers choice over delivery point. 
Contract size was raised to 600,000 barrels (Bossley 2003).  
15 The monthly trading and delivery cycle is most easily described by example, say for the month of July. A cargo 
assigned loading dates of July 29–31 can be traded forward until July 14 (assuming these are all business days). 
After this date, there no longer remain the requisite 15 days notice, and the cargo can be traded only on the spot 
market. A cargo assigned lifting dates of July 1–3 “becomes spot” after June 16. The scheduling for July loadings is 
carried out in mid-June, in time to provide 15 days notice for the earliest July deliveries. 
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Market Participants  
                                                
Participants in the Brent market are diverse, allowing the opportunity to test hypotheses 
regarding behavioral differences across types of companies and geographic origin. The largest 
traders fall into two categories. The first comprises companies active in the business of 
producing or using crude oil—majors (descendants of the “seven sisters,” the largest petroleum 
multinationals), other integrated petroleum companies, producers (i.e., upstream only), refiners 
(i.e., downstream only), and national oil companies (many of the largest firms in the industry are 
state-owned).  
The second category comprises financial houses and trading companies—Wall Street 
banks, commodity traders, and Japanese general trading companies (sogo shosha). ITIs have 
long been important in commodity trade, starting with the English and Dutch East India 
Companies (spices, silks) and Hudson’s Bay Company (furs) in the seventeenth century. 
Transaction-cost theory predicts that trade intermediation is more likely to occur in commodities 
than in more complex goods, sales of which are harder to monitor and tend to require more asset-
specific investment, hence lending themselves to vertical integration (Peng and York 2001).  
ITIs tend to be important in international commerce in petroleum, just as for other 
commodities.16 The wave of nationalizations in oil-exporting countries in the 1970s saw control 
of marketing channels pass from the hands of the vertically integrated multinational “seven 
sisters” to newly-created national oil companies (Levy 1982). These companies lacked 
established commercial relationships and turned in part to ITIs as purchasers.17 
Financial information on modern ITIs is limited by the fact that most are privately held or 
subsidiaries of larger firms. The most active ITIs in the Brent market in 1991 were (in order of 
trading activity) J Aron (part of Goldman Sachs), Phibro (part of Salomon Brothers), Cargill, 
 
16 ITIs handle 70 percent or more of the international grain trade and are also large participants in international trade 
in cocoa, coffee, cotton, sugar, and non-ferrous metals (Chalmin 1987). Roehl, Chee, and Cho 1984 discuss the role 
of GTCs in the Asian markets for aluminum, tin, and plywood. The role of the sogo shosha in Japanese crude oil 
imports is described in Yoshino and Lifson 1986. Cho 1987 lists the main products handled by Taiwanese and 
Turkish GTCs. The main products handled by GTCs from several countries are set out in Ozawa 1988. Peng 1998 
surveyed U.S. report-trading companies; 70 percent of the respondents handled commodities. 
17 For example, Glencore (formerly Marc Rich) got its start in the 1970s based on relationships with the 
governments of Iran and Nigeria, two large oil-exporting countries (Guex 1998, 167). 
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Morgan Stanley, and Marc Rich (now Glencore); in 2001, Phibro, Sempra, Morgan Stanley, 
Vitol, and Glencore.18 None of these ITIs is publicly held. 
Data 
 As in all markets not conducted through public auctions or organized exchanges, Brent 
transactions are private. However, the Brent market is sufficiently large and important for price 
setting in the international crude oil market that its prices are widely reported by firms that 
specialize in data acquisition and dissemination.19 The data used in this paper are generated by a 
daily industry survey of oil traders. The necessity of conducting surveys to obtain data is 
serendipitous, because the resulting database is composed of individual transactions, which are 
rarely accessible to researchers.20 
The database used in this paper covers the period 1990–1991 (which includes the Gulf 
Crisis, and the periods immediately before and after), and is unusual in identifying the parties in 
each transaction, as well as the transaction terms. Market participants are categorized by type in 
a manner that makes investigation of trade patterns feasible. Nine types of firms are identified in 
the database as players in this market—the five oil company types and three ITI types listed 
above, plus a residual category (labeled “unknown”) for typically small, infrequently-active 
companies that could not be classified by the survey compilers.21 
Table 1 provides a summary of trader types and their activity in the Brent market during 
the period 1990–1991, along with an indication of the relative sizes of the participants, in terms 
of the number of transactions in this market. Trade patterns during the crisis, as well as 
immediately before and after, are detailed in Table 2. Of the 10,546 transactions during the 
                                                 
18 Data for the early 1990s are from Horsnell and Mabro 1993, for 2001, Petroleum Argus Global Markets (2001). 
19 The data used in this paper come from one of these firms, the London-based Petroleum Argus, which surveys oil-
market participants daily. I am grateful to Petroleum Argus for making the data available. 
20 Two questions of data reliability arise when using survey information: 1) sample representativeness, and 2) 
respondents’ incentives to reply truthfully. While it is impossible to say for sure, neither is likely to be a serious 
problem here. The market is small enough, and reputation important enough, that deciding whom to survey is not an 
issue. The survey is carried out every business day and tries to reach all buyers and sellers in the market, rather than 
a sample of them. Only transactions verified by both buyer and seller are registered. Horsnell and Mabro (1993) 
estimate that the survey catches 40–50 percent of all transactions. A description of the database, including the names 
of the companies in each category, can be found in Petroleum Argus Global Markets (1987). 
21 Because of their transaction numbers are small, national oil companies are included in the integrated category and 
producers and refiners are lumped together in the tables and statistical analysis below. 
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period, roughly 85 percent involved an ITI; in about one-third of the transactions, both parties 
were ITIs.  
IV. The Gulf Crisis 
Background22  
On August 2, 1990 Iraq invaded its neighbor Kuwait, setting off the Gulf Crisis. As part 
of the diplomatic response to the invasion, the United Nations embargoed oil exports from the 
two countries, resulting in a supply disruption equivalent to roughly 8 percent of oil consumption 
(excluding the former Soviet bloc, which remains largely insulated from the world oil market). 
Because previously loaded oil takes about a month to reach oil-refining centers, the full supply 
disruption did not register until September. 
The fall of 1990 was characterized by diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis through 
persuading the Iraqi government to remove its army from Kuwait, by a major military build-up 
in the Middle East by the United States and its allies (Operation Desert Storm), and by threats of 
force on both sides. Despite last-minute efforts to negotiate a settlement, diplomacy eventually 
failed. Allied military intervention (Operation Desert Storm) commenced with air strikes on 
January 16, 1991, and a ground war began February 24, 1991. A unilateral cease-fire was 
declared by the allies on February 28, 1991. 
 The Oil Market in the Crisis23 
Despite the relatively brief duration of the disruption, oil prices climbed dramatically. 
The spot price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil jumped from $21.60 to $23.70 per 
barrel on August 2 (the day Iraq invaded Kuwait), and reached $28.75 per barrel on August 6. 
Prices continued climbing through September and reached a maximum of $41.10 per barrel on 
October 11. On November 29, the UN Security Council approved a resolution authorizing the 
use of force if Iraq did not withdraw from the Kuwait by January 15; crude oil prices fell more 
than $4 per barrel the next day. By the end of year, prices had fallen back to about $30 per barrel. 
When the air war broke out, the spot price fell about $10 per barrel in a single day, bringing it 
back to its pre-invasion level. 
                                                 
22 For an overview of the crisis, see Ridgeway (1991). 
23 Studies of oil-price volatility during the crisis include Melick and Thomas (1997) and Weiner (2005). 
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Figure 1 displays spot prices for the period 1989 through 1991.24 The figure reveals the 
tremendous price-spike associated with the crisis. The rapid increase in prices during the early 
part of the crisis is likely to have exposed traders with commitments to make delivery to 
enormous losses; the price plunge in the latter part is likely to have placed those with 
commitments to take delivery in a similar position. 
V. The Role of ITIs in a Crisis 
Background 
The international oil market in the Gulf Crisis serves as a natural laboratory for 
examining ITI behavior, for several reasons. First, ITIs compete directly with large, industrial 
companies, facilitating comparison of their roles in market functioning with non-crisis periods. 
Second, the extreme price volatility during the crisis evident in Figure 1, in combination with the 
information structure of the market (where terms of deals done are available only at the end of 
the day; see discussion above), implies that ITIs should do well, and play a bigger role in trade 
than during calm periods.  
Third, several different types of ITIs compete actively in the market, facilitating 
comparisons among the widely diversified sogo shosha, trading arms of well-capitalized Wall 
Street banks, trading companies with varying reputations and capital bases, and small, lightly-
capitalized, specialty traders. Fourth, the crisis originated far from the trading arena, eliminating 
the possibility of simultaneity bias in analyzing trading patterns.25 Finally, the tremendous price 
volatility evident in Figure 1 increased the risk of contractual nonperformance and even 
bankruptcy of the lightly capitalized ITIs participating in the market. 
                                                 
24 The prices shown are actually for the nearby WTI crude oil futures contract on the New York Mercantile 
Exchange. As a result of the logistics of scheduling delivery of WTI through the pipeline system, so-called "spot" 
transactions are actually for one month ahead. Thus the nearby (i.e., one-month-maturity) futures prices and spot 
prices are virtually identical. 
25 In contrast, default by participants in the case-study market during an earlier period led to a change in trade 
patterns (Weiner 1994). 
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Hypotheses 
Trade patterns before the crisis: 
H1Ø. Pre-crisis trade patterns are consistent with a random-arrival model.26 
H1A. ITIs played an intermediary role in this market, even before the crisis. 
ITIs’ role in the market during the crisis: 
H2Ø. ITIs’ role in the market was not affected by the crisis. 
H2A. ITIs became more important during the crisis than before or after. 
H2B. ITIs became less important during the crisis than before or after. 
Path dependence in non-crisis periods: 
H3Ø. Differences in the structure of trading in the market before and after the crisis are 
random. 
H3A. Differences in the structure of trading in the market before and after the crisis result 
from the crisis. 
Trade patterns after the crisis: 
H4Ø. Differences in the structure of trading in the market during and after the crisis are 
random. 
H4A. Differences in the structure of trading in the market during and after the crisis are 
different as a result of changes in the environment, e.g., decreased volatility. 
                                                 
26 In the absence of intermediation, buyers and sellers come to the market randomly, and the probability of any two 
trader–types’ meeting depends only on the trader–types’ respective shares of the buyer and seller populations; i.e., a 
given trader’s transactions by partner type are drawn by pure chance from the pool of all transactions. More detail 
on the model is provided below. 
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VI. Statistical Analysis 
All the world’s a stage, 
And all the men and women merely players. 
They have their exits and their entrances . . . 
—Shakespeare, As You Like It, Act II, Scene vii 
A Statistical Model of Trade Patterns 
This section presents a statistical model of trade patterns, as well as tests of the ITI 
activity in the international oil market, comparing the crisis with the periods immediately before 
and after.27 The approach adopted here is nonparametric, following Weiner 1994. The tests are 
based on a statistical model of trade patterns. The null hypothesis (H2Ø above) states that there 
is no change in patterns of trade intermediation associated with the Gulf Crisis. If the null 
hypothesis is false, then the Gulf-Crisis period should be associated with either fewer direct 
transactions between oil companies and trading companies (under H2A), or more (under H2B). 
As noted above, in the absence of intermediation, the process of trade can be modeled 
quite simply. Buyers and sellers come to the market randomly (“they have their exits and their 
entrances”). The stochastic processes governing the arrival of buyers and sellers are independent, 
so that the probability of any two trader –types’ meeting depends only on the trader–types’ 
respective shares of the buyer and seller populations; i.e., a given trader’s transactions by partner 
type are drawn by pure chance from the pool of all transactions. 
If certain trader types play the role of intermediaries, however, then the null hypothesis is 
no longer valid, pairings of buyers and sellers are no longer purely random, and the distribution 
of a trader type’s partners will differ from the distribution in the entire population. In the absence 
of a model of the arrival processes, the statistical tests are nonparametric, based on counting each 
trader type’s transactions by partner type and are designed to reject the null hypothesis when a 
given trader type’s partner distribution differs sufficiently from that of the partner population. 
In equation form, the difference Dij between actual and expected (under the null 
hypothesis) sales from trader type i to type j is given by: 
(1)Dij = Aij - sibj/n 
                                                 
27 The data cover the years 1990 and 1991; the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods are of comparable length 
(roughly 7 months, 7 months, and 10 months, respectively).  
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where Aij is the actual number of sales from type i to type j, si is type i’s total sales, bj is 
type j’s total purchases, and n = ∑si = ∑bj is the total number of transactions in the market.28 
Under the null hypothesis, the expectation of the random variable Dij is zero. Of course, 
Dij is unlikely to be exactly zero, due to the stochastic nature of the matching process. In 
contrast, under the alternative hypothesis that refiners prefer to do business with trading 
companies through intermediaries, Dij should be negative in the case where type i is trading 
companies and type j is refiners.  
To conduct statistical tests, standard errors for Dij must be calculated. Taking each type’s 
entirety of trades as its population, samples of its transactions by partner type will be drawn from 
a multivariate hypergeometric distribution under the null hypothesis.29  
 In the absence of a comprehensive model of traders’ propensity to transact, by partner 
type, the most straightforward way to determine whether the Gulf Crisis affected the role of ITIs 
in the market is to compare trading patterns before, during, and after the crisis. Accordingly, 
panels B, C, and D split the trading patterns of Table 2A into pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis 
periods. 
Empirical Results 
1. Rejection of the first null hypothesis: trade patterns before the crisis are consistent with 
intermediation by trader types T and W. 
Table 3A presents the trade patterns expected under the null hypothesis that buyers and 
sellers meet randomly each period (sibj/n in equation (1) above); the difference (Dij in equation 
                                                 
28 This is an application of the general log-linear statistical model (see Wickens 1989). As an example, suppose that 
major oil companies as a group account for 20 percent of all forward purchases. In the absence of trade 
intermediation, they should also account for 20 percent of all purchases from trading companies. An “expected” 
number of sales from trading companies to majors can be obtained by multiplying the 20 percent figure by trading 
companies’ total sales. Note that in general Dij and Dji are not equal, because actual sales from type i to type j and 
actual purchases by type i from type j will generally differ. 
29 The hypergeometric distribution applies when sampling is done without replacement. The sampling problem 
described in the text is equivalent to picking a black ball (representing, say, the seller) and a white ball (representing 
the buyer) together, without replacement, out of an urn with n black balls (purchases) and n white balls (sales). Si of 
the black balls are labeled with the ith seller type, and bj of the white balls are labeled with the jth buyer type. 
Because the black balls and white balls are chosen independently, the probability of choosing a black ball of type i 
and a white ball of type j is (si/n)*(bj/n). The expected number of sales from type i to type j is si*bj/n. In the 
empirical calculations below, the normal approximation to the hypergeometric distribution (see Feller 1968) is used 
to estimate the standard errors. 
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(1) above), along with their standard errors, are presented in Table 4A.30 The table suggests that 
a model wherein traders meet randomly is very unlikely to have generated the data, even before 
the crisis; 53 (respectively, 77) of the 196 differences estimated are significant at the 1 percent 
(respectively, 10 percent) level (two-tailed test of the null Dij = 0 against the alternative Dij ≠ 0), 
versus 2 (respectively, 20) expected by chance. The χ
2 value for testing the independence of 
rows and columns implied by the null hypothesis is 367 (36 df), far exceeding the 0.1 percent 
critical value of 68 for χ
2
36; we can be far more than 99.9 percent confident that the null 
hypothesis is false.  
For insight into deviations from the random-arrival model, consider the trade patterns for 
the integrated oil companies (I), which produce some of the commodity and have the second-
largest number of transactions over the entire period: 4,586 purchases and sales, roughly 22 
percent of the grand total of 21,092 (counting each transaction as both a purchase and a sale). 
The integrated companies tended not to deal with each other before the crisis; the 64 I-I 
transactions are a significant 42 (40 percent) fewer than would occur by chance.31 The integrated 
companies also display, inter alia, an unexpectedly large number of sales to, and purchases from, 
trading companies (T) and Wall Street Banks (W). A glance at Table 4A suggests that these two 
trader types indeed functioned as intermediaries, taking the opposite side of trades with the two 
main oil company groups (I,M) more often than would be expected by chance and trading less 
often than expected within their own groups. 
2. Rejection of the second null hypothesis: the fabric of trade during the crisis differs from 
non-crisis periods. 
A simple comparison of the fraction of all sales32 to intermediaries (types S,T,U,W) 
between periods reveals a decline in intermediaries’ market share—from 63 percent before the 
crisis to 60 percent during the crisis and 54 percent afterward. The differences between periods 
are significant at the 1 percent level, with χ
2 values of 9.0 (pre- versus crisis), 25.2 (crisis versus 
post-) and 64.6 (pre- versus post-) respectively, all in excess of the 1 percent critical value of 6.6 
for χ
2
1. The experiences of the various trader types were diverse, however, with the sogo shosha 
and unknown types losing share during the crisis and not regaining it, the Wall Street banks 
                                                 
30 All estimated trade flows are rounded to nearest integer in the tables.  
31 In the text, significance refers to the ten-percent level (two-tailed test). Table 4A indicate statistical significance at 
the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels by superscripts a, b, and c, respectively. 
32 Purchases are similar, but not reported here. 
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losing share but regaining it afterward, and other trading companies increasing their share and 
maintaining it afterward.  
Table 3B presents the trade patterns expected under the null hypothesis of no change in 
structure over time. Unlike Table 3A, no assumptions are made regarding propensity to trade 
with different types of counterparties; only observed patterns are stable over the three periods. 
Deviations from actual patterns are shown in Table 4B; for example, the major and integrated 
companies started trading more with each other and among themselves, bypassing the 
intermediaries during the crisis—and continued even more so afterward. The χ
2 value (96 df) for 
testing the independence of time period implied by the null hypothesis, while not requiring 
independence of rows and columns,33 far exceeds the 0.1 percent critical value for χ
2
96. Thus, 
we can be far more than 99.9 percent confident that the null hypothesis is false.  
3. Rejection of the third and fourth null hypotheses: the fabric of trade differs between pre- 
and post-crisis periods, and between crisis and post-crisis periods. 
Differences in the structure of trading in the market before and after the crisis are too 
large to be attributable to random factors. Table 3C presents the trade patterns expected under the 
null hypothesis of no path dependence in non-crisis periods. Just as in Table 3B, no assumptions 
are made regarding propensity to trade with different types of counterparties—only that observed 
patterns are stable over the two non-crisis periods. 
Deviations from actual patterns are shown in Table 4C. Only the pre-crisis period is 
shown; the post-crisis period is a mirror image, as these deviations must sum to zero across the 
two periods. Just as above, the majors and integrated companies bypassed intermediaries, trading 
more with each other and among themselves after the crisis than before. As above, while not 
requiring independence of rows and columns, the χ
2 value (48 df) for testing the independence of 
time period implied by the null hypothesis far exceeds the 0.1 percent critical value for χ
2
48; we 
can be far more than 99.9 percent confident that the null hypothesis is false. A similar result 
holds for the crisis and post-crisis periods (not shown). 
                                                 
33 The null hypothesis implies that the two-way contingency tables for each period differ only by random variation 
and scale factors associated with the total transactions in the period. Failure to reject the null hypothesis implies that 
the three-way contingency table cannot be reduced to three two-way tables (see Wickens 1989).  
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VII. Conclusion 
This paper has taken advantage of a unique transaction-level database with buyer and 
seller information to examine the fabric of international oil trade during the period of the Gulf 
Crisis. Statistical evidence supports the view that trading patterns changed during the crisis, with 
intermediaries playing a smaller role than before in serving as counterparties to the large oil 
companies that produce the commodity. Moreover, there is evidence of path dependence: While 
the market in the aftermath of the crisis looked much like that preceding it, the fabric had 
changed. One possibility is that lightly capitalized trading companies were seen as less 
creditworthy after the crisis than before. 
ITIs continue to be important in world oil trade, notwithstanding predictions of their 
demise as a result of improving information systems. Some ITIs have entered upstream or 
downstream segments of the industry; the reason for others’ survival is hard to pinpoint, given 
the paucity of data. The dominant role played by ITIs as purchasers of Iraq’s oil exports during 
the UN Oil-for-Food Program, and the extensive diversion of funds designated for humanitarian 
aid suggests the usefulness of ongoing research into their role and behavior in international oil 
trade.  
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Tables and Figure 
 
Table 1. Trader Types, Characteristics, and Number of Transactions, 1990–1991  
 
Code Company  Type  Sales  Purchases Description 
 
Companies with upstream or downstream capacity  
 
I  integrated  2,282  2,304  both upstream and downstream capacity (Statoil) 
M major  1,728 1,853  descendents of “seven sisters” (Shell) 
P,R  producer, refiner   206   217  upstream or downstream capacity only (Enterprise) 
 
Companies with neither upstream nor downstream capacity 
 
S  sogo shosha   419   298      Japanese general trading companies (Kanematsu) 
T  trading company  2,646  2,737  other than S,W (Cargill) 
W  Wall Street  2,335  2,039  US Investment banks (Morgan Stanley) 
U  unknown   930  1,098  companies that could not be classified by the survey 
 
 
Note: The total number of transactions (equals sales equals purchases) is 10,546. The categories are mutually 
exclusive and collectively exhaustive. A list of companies by category is given in Petroleum Argus  (1987). 
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A .   E n t i r e   P e r i o d             
Seller/Buyer I  M  P+R  S T  W  U  Total 
I  403  381  45  57  652 526 218  2,282 
M  378  239  21  38  459 417 176  1,728 
P+R  44  21  2  6  33 76 24  206 
S  76  68  3  12 123 99  38 419 
T  597  492  52  82  602 573 248  2,646 
W  607  499  80  83  661 238 167  2,335 
U  199  153  14  20  207 110 227 930 
Total  2,304  1,853  217  298  2,737 2,039 1,098  10,546 
            
B. Pre-invasion 1/2/1990–8/1/1990        
Seller/Buyer I  M  P+R  S T  W  U  Total 
I  64  73  12  25 151  165 82 572 
M  88  55  3  22 107  129 70 474 
P+R  7  4  2  1 11  18 7 50 
S  28  34  2  7  53 53 17  194 
T  143  123  16  39 131  156 80 688 
W  175  150  25  51 176 62  58 697 
U  61  45  6  15 71 39  139  376 
Total  566  484  66  160 700 622 453  3,051 
            
C. Invasion and War 8/2/1990–2/28/1991        
Seller/Buyer I  M  P+R  S T  W  U  Total 
I  142  112  14  19 235  170 83 775 
M  95  68  10  13 138  101 54 479 
P+R  17  8  0  4  9 24 9 71 
S  29  14  1  5  41 27 18  135 
T  210  116  17  29 211  180 97 860 
W  217  117  27  24 201 69  65 720 
U  81  52  5  4  79 34 63  318 
Total  791  487  74  98  914 605 389  3,358 
            
D. Aftermath 3/1/1991–12/31/91        
Seller/Buyer I  M  P+R  S T  W  U  Total 
I  197  196  19  13 266  191 53 935 
M  195  116  8  3  214  187 52 775 
P+R  20  9  0  1 13  34 8 85 
S  19  20  0  0 29  19 3 90 
T  244  253  19  14 260  237 71  1098 
W  215  232  28  8  284  107 44 918 
U  57  56  3  1  57 37 25  236 
Total  947  882  77  40  1,123 812  256 4,137 
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Table 3a. Trade Patterns Expected under Null Hypothesis that Buyers and Traders Meet 
Randomly Each Period 
A.  Entire  Period            
 Seller/Buyer  I  M  P+R  S  T  W  U  Total 
  I  499  401 47  64  592 441 238 2,282 
  M  378  304 36  49  448 334 180 1,728 
  P+R  45  36  4 6 53  40  21  206 
  S  92  74 9  12 109  81 44 419 
  T  578  465 54  75  687 512 275 2,646 
  W  510  410 48  66  606 451 243 2,335 
  U  203  163  19 26 241  180  97 930 
  Total  2,304 1,853  217  298  2,737  2,039  1098  10,546 
             
             
B. Pre-invasion 1/2/1990–8/1/1990        
 Seller/Buyer  I  M  P+R  S  T  W  U  Total 
  I  106  91 12 30 131  117  85 572 
  M  88  75 10 25 109  97 70 474 
  P+R  9  8 1 3 11  10  7 50 
  S  36  31 4  10 45 40 29 194 
  T  128  109 15  36  158 140 102 688 
  W  129  111 15  37  160 142 103 697 
  U  70  60 8  20 86 77 56 376 
  Total  566  484 66  160 700 622 453 3,051 
             
C. Invasion/War 8/2/1990–2/28/1991       
 Seller/Buyer  I  M  P+R  S  T  W  U  Total 
  I  183  112  17 23 211  140  90 775 
  M  113  69 11 14 130  86 55 479 
  P+R  17  10  2 2 19  13  8 71 
  S  32  20  3 4 37  24  16  135 
  T  203  125 19  25  234 155 100 860 
  W  170  104  16 21 196  130  83 720 
  U  75  46  7 9 87  57  37  318 
  Total  791  487 74  98  914 605 389 3,358 
             
D. Aftermath 3/1/1991–end        
 Seller/Buyer  I  M  P+R  S  T  W  U  Total 
  I  214 199  17  9  254  184  58  935 
  M  177 165  14  7  210  152  48  775 
  P+R  19  18  2 1 23  17  5 85 
  S  21  19  2 1 24  18  6 90 
  T  251  234  20 11 298  216  68 1,098 
  W  210 196  17  9  249  180  57  918 
  U  54  50  4 2 64  46  15  236 
  Total  947  882 77  40  1,123  812 256 4,137 
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Table 3b. Trade Patterns Expected under Null Hypothesis of No Change in Patterns  
over Time 
A. Pre-invasion 1/2/1990–8/1/1990           
Seller/Buyer I  M  P+R  S  T W  U  Total 
I  117 110  13  16  189  152  63  660 
M  109 69  6  11  133  121  51  500 
P+R  13 6  1  2  10  22  7  60 
S  22 20  1  3  36  29  11  121 
T  173 142  15  24  174  166  72  765 
W  176 144  23  24  191  69  48  676 
U  58 44  4  6  60  32  66  269 
Total  667 536  63  86  792  590  318 3,051 
                
B. Invasion/War 8/2/1990–2/28/1991        
Seller/Buyer I  M  P+R  S  T W  U  Total 
I  128 121  14  18  208  167  69  727 
M  120 76  7  12  146  133  56  550 
P+R  14 7  1  2  11  24  8  66 
S  24 22  1  4  39  32  12  133 
T  190 157  17  26  192  182  79  843 
W  193 159  25  26  210  76  53  743 
U  63 49  4  6  66  35  72  296 
Total  734 590  69  95  872  649  350 3,358 
                
C. Aftermath 3/1/1991–end            
Seller/Buyer I  M  P+R  S  T W  U  Total 
I  158 149  18  22  256  206  86  895 
M  148 94  8  15  180  164  69  678 
P+R  17 8  1  2  13  30  9  81 
S  30 27  1  5  48  39  15  164 
T  234 193  20  32  236  225  97  1,038 
W  238 196  31  33  259  93  66  916 
U  78 60  5  8  81  43  89  365 
Total  904 727  85  117  1,074 800  431 4,137 
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Table 3c. Trade Patterns Expected under Null Hypothesis of No Path Dependence in  
Non-Crisis Periods 
A. Pre-invasion 1/2/1990–8/1/1990      
Seller/Buyer I  M  P+R  S  T  W  U  Total 
I  111  114 13  16 177  151 57 640 
M  120 73  5  11 136  134 52 530 
P+R  11 6  1  1 10  22 6 57 
S  20  23 1  3 35  31 8  121 
T  164  160 15  22 166  167 64 758 
W  166  162 22  25 195 72  43 685 
U  50 43  4  7  54 32 70  260 




B. Aftermath 3/1/1991–end           
Seller/Buyer  I  M  P+R  S  T  W  U  Total 
I  150  155  18  22  240  205  78  867 
M  163  98  6  14  185  182  70  719 
P+R  16  7  1  1  14  30  9  78 
S  27  31  1  4  47  41  12  163 
T  223  216  20  31  225  226  87  1,028 
W  224  220  31  34  265  97  59  930 
U  68  58  5  9  74  44  94  352 
Total  871  786  82  115  1,049  825  408  4,137 
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Table 4a: Deviations from Trade Patterns—Actual Less Expected under Null Hypothesis that Buyers and Sellers Meet 
Randomly Each Period 
 
 A. Entire Period              
  I  (std err)  M  (std err)  P+R  (std err)  S  (std err)  T  (std err)  W  (std err)  U  (std err) 
I  -96
c  (17.47)  -20  (16.09)  -2  (6.00)  -7  (7.01)  60
c (18.54)  85
c (16.70)  -20 (12.91)   
M  0  (15.71)  -65
c  (14.47)  -15
c  (5.40)  -11
a  (6.30)  11 (16.66)  83
c (15.01)  -4 (11.61)   
P+R  -1  (5.87)  -15
c  (5.41)  -2  (2.02)  0  (2.35)  -20
c (6.23)  36
c (5.61)  3  (4.34) 
S  -16  (8.29)  -6  (7.63)  -6
b  (2.85)  0  (3.32)  14 (8.79)  18
b (7.92)  -6 (6.13)   
T  19  (18.40)  27  (16.94)  -2  (6.32)  7  (7.38)  -85
c (19.52)  61
c (17.58)  -27 (13.60) 
 b 
W  97
c  (17.62)  89
c  (16.23)  32
c  (6.05)  17
b  (7.07)  55
c (18.69)  -213
c (16.84)  -76
c (13.02)   
U  -4  (12.03)  -10  (11.08)  -5  (4.13)  -6  (4.83)  -34
c (12.77)  -70
c (11.50)  130 (8.89) 
c 
                           
B. Pre-invasion 1/2/1990–8/1/1990        
  I  (std err)  M  (std err)  P+ (std err)  S  (std err)  T  (std err)  W  (std err)  U  (std err)  R 
I  -42
c  (8.38)  -18
b  (7.88)  0  (3.14)  -5  (4.81)  20
b (9.06)  48
c (8.69)  -3 (7.67)   
M  0  (7.78)  -20
c  (7.31)  -7
b (2.91)  -3  (4.46)  -2 (8.41)  32
c (8.06)  0  (7.11)   
P+R  -2  (2.73)  -4  (2.56)  1  (1.02)  -2  (1.56)  0 (2.95)  8
c (2.83)  0 (2.49)   
S  -8  (5.24)  3  (4.92)  -2  (1.96)  -3  (3.00)  8 (5.67)  13
b (5.43)  -12 (4.79) 
 b 
T  15
a  (8.97)  14  (8.43)  1  (3.36)  3  (5.15)  -27
c (9.71)  16  (9.30)  -22
c (8.21)   
W  46
c  (9.01)  39
c  (8.47)  10
c  (3.37)  14
c  (5.17)  16
a (9.75)  -80
c (9.34)  -45
c (8.25)   
U  -9  (7.06)  -15
b  (6.63)  -2  (2.64)  -5  (4.05)  -15
b (7.63)  -38  (7.31)  83
c  (6.46) 
    C. Invasion/War 8/2/1990–2/28/1991        
 I  (std err)  M  (std err)  P+R  (std err)  S  (std err)  T  (std err)  W  (std err)  U  (std err) 
I  -41
c  (10.36)  0  (4.85)  -3  (2.02)  -4  (2.32)  24
c (6.13)  30




b  (8.60)  -1  (7.14)  -1  (2.97)  -1  (3.41)  8 (9.02)  15
a (7.79)  -1 (6.49)   
P+R  0  (3.54)  -2  (2.94)  -2  (1.22)  2  (1.40)  -10
c (3.71)  11
c (3.20)  1  (2.67) 
S  -3  (4.83)  -6  (4.01)  -2  (1.67)  1  (1.92)  4 (5.07)  3  (4.37)  2 (3.64)   
T  7  (10.73)  -9  (8.91)  -2  (3.71)  4  (4.26)  -23
b (11.26)  25
b (9.72)  -3 (8.09)   
W  47
c  (10.09)  13  (8.37)  11
c  (3.49)  3  (4.00)  5 (10.59)  -61
c (9.14)  -18
b (7.61)   
U  6  (7.20)  6  (5.97)  -2  (2.49)  -5  (2.86)  -8 (7.55)  -23
c (6.52)  26
c  (5.43) 
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D. Aftermath 3/1/1991–end            
 I  (std err)  M  (std err)  P+R  (std err)  S  (std err)  T  (std err)  W  (std err)  U  (std err) 
I  -17  (11.30)  -3  (11.02)  2  (3.64)  4  (2.63)  12 (11.96)  7  (10.68)  -5  (6.48) 
M  18
a  (10.54)  -49
c  (10.28)  -6  (3.39)  -4  (2.46)  4 (11.16)  35
c (9.97)  4  (6.05) 
P+R  1  (3.83)  -9
b  (3.74)  -2  (1.23)  0  (0.89)  -10
b (4.06)  17
c (3.62)  3  (2.20) 
S  -2  (3.94)  1  (3.84)  -2  (1.27)  -1  (0.92)  5 (4.17)  1  (3.73)  -3  (2.26) 
T  -7  (11.93)  19  (11.63)  -1  (3.84)  3  (2.78)  -38
c (12.63)  21
a (11.28)  3  (6.84) 
W  5  (11.23)  36
c  (10.95)  11
c  (3.61)  -1  (2.62)  35
c (11.89)  -73
c (10.62)  -13
b  (6.44) 
U  3  (6.27)  6  (6.11)  -1  (2.02)  -1  (1.46)  -7 (6.63)  -9  (5.93)  10
c  (3.59) 
 
Note: Significance levels (2-tailed test against H0: actual–expected = 0): a – 10%, b – 5%, c – 1% 
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Table 4b: Deviations from Trade Patterns—Actual Less Expected under Null Hy
nge in Patterns over Time 
 
 
invasion –8/1/1           
ler/Buye
nge in Patterns over Time 
 
 













990 990 990  990 
I  I  M  M P+R P+R    S S   T T   W W   U U    To Total tal
A.
I  -53 -37  -1  9  -38  13 19  -88 
M  -21 -14  -3  11  -26 8 19  -26 
P+R  -6  1 -1  -4  0  -1 -2  1  0 
S  6 14 1 4  17  24  6  73 
T  -30 -19  1  15  -43  -10 8  -77 
W  -1 6 2  27  -15  -7  10  21 
U  3  9  11  73  1 2  7  107 
Total  -101 -52  3  74 -92 32 135 0 
            











  r  P+R  S T W U Total
I  14 -9  0  1  27  3  14  48 
M  -25 -8  3  1  -8  -32  -2  -71 
P+R 3 1  2  -2  1  5    -1  0 
S  5 -8 0 1  2  -5  6  2 
T  20 -41  0  3  19 -2 18  17 
W  24 -42  2  -2  -9 -7 12  -23 
U  18 3  1 -   22   -2  13  1  -9
Total  57 -103  5  3 42 -44 39 0 
            

















  M P+R S T W U Total
I  39 47  1 -9  10  -15  -33  40 
M  47 22  -12  34  -17  97  0  23 
P+R  -1 3 1 -1    0  4  -1  4 
S  -11 -7  -1 -5  -19  -20  -12  -74 
T  10 60 -1  -18  24  12  -26  60 
W  -23  36  -25  25  22 2  -3  14 -
U  -21 -4  -2 -7  -24  -6  -64  -129 
Total  43  155  -8  -77 49  12 -175 0 
 Resources for the Future  Weiner 
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Table 4c: Deviations from Trade Patterns—Actual Less Expected under Null Hypothesis 






Table 4c: Deviations from Trade Patterns—Actual Less Expected under Null Hypothesis 




o of N f N
Pre-invasion 1/2/1990–8/1/1990 
Se M P+R  S  T  W  U  Total  ller/Buyer I 
I  -47 -41 -1  9  -26 14  25  -68 
M  -32 -18 -2 11 -29 -5  18  -56 
P+R -2 1 0 1 -4 1  -7    -4 
S  8 11  1  4  18  22 9  73 
T  -21 -37 1 17 -35 -11 16  -70 
W  9 -12  3  26  -19  -10  15 12 
U  11 2 2  8  17 7 69  116 
Total  -76 -96 5 75 -74 13 152  0 
 Resources for the Future                                                                     Weiner 
 
Figure 1: CRUDE OIL PRICES, 1989-1991
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